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Abstract
Messaging platforms, especially those with a mobile focus,
have become increasingly ubiquitous in society. These mobile
messaging platforms can have deceivingly large user bases,
and in addition to being a way for people to stay in touch, are
often used to organize social movements, as well as a place for
extremists and other ne’er-do-well to congregate.
In this paper, we present a dataset from one such mobile
messaging platform: Telegram. Our dataset is made up of over
27.8K channels and 317M messages from 2.2M unique users.
To the best of our knowledge, our dataset comprises the largest
and most complete of its kind. In addition to the raw data, we
also provide the source code used to collect it, allowing re-
searchers to run their own data collection instance. We believe
the Pushshift Telegram dataset can help researchers from a va-
riety of disciplines interested in studying online social move-
ments, protests, political extremism, and disinformation.
1 Introduction
While the modern social media ecosystem is certainly dom-
inated by a few major players, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Red-
dit, etc., there are a variety of lesser known platforms with
high active user bases. One such platform is Telegram, a mo-
bile messaging app that has broader social media style fea-
tures. Telegram is particularly interesting due to its use by so-
cial movements to disseminate information. For example, the
Hong Kong protesters made use of Telegram to organize some
of their activities. Unfortunately, not all uses of Telegram are
generally positive: Telegram is also home to a vast network of
right wing extremist groups, who use it to organize as well as
disseminate racist and violent ideology.
In this paper, we present the Pushshift Telegram Dataset. to
the best of our knowledge, our dataset represents, by far, the
largest collection of Telegram data made available to the pub-
lic. While our dataset is available for download as static snap-
shots, it is also under periodic collection. The most current
snapshot is available at https://zenodo.org/record/3607497.
At the time of this writing, the Pushshift Telegram Dataset
comprises 27,801 channels and 317,224,715 messages from
2,200,040 unique users.
Also, we make publicly our data collection source code
at https://github.com/pushshift/telegram. The code can be re-
used by other researchers that want to take information from
specific Telegram channels for their research.
In the remainder of this paper, we provide some background
on Telegram, describe our dataset, and perform some general
characterization of the dataset.
2 Background & Related Work
Telegram was started in August 2013 as an encrypted instant
messaging platform. Telegram users provide a telephone num-
ber to access the service. Messages between users are stored
in a centralized cloud-based storage and (with the exception of
“secret chats”) can be accessed by multiple devices that have
been linked to a single user’s account. In addition to the user-
to-user secure messaging features, Telegram added broadcast
channels for one-to-many communication in September 2015.
Such broadcast channels can be created by any Telegram user,
and other Telegram users can join or subscribe to the chan-
nel to read its content. Content in a channel mostly consists
of messages, which take the form of text, still images, audio
files, video files, and so on. Other messages sent in channels
are service messages, for example status messages or errors,
but these are largely invisible to regular users of the platform.
These broadly-available and widely used Telegram channels
are designed for information dissemination thus are the sub-
ject of this dataset project.
Previous work that used Telegram. A large body of previ-
ous work studies the Telegram ecosystem itself, or uses data
from Telegram to study specific emerging research problems.
Specifically,Anglano et al. [3] and Satrya et al. [18] study the
artifacts generated by the Telegram android application on the
Android platform. They propose a methodology that enable the
reconstruction of important information involved in the Tele-
gram application like list of contacts, messages exchanged be-
tween users, and information about the channels and groups
that the user is involved.
Sutikno et al. [20] study the features that are available in
three popular messaging applications: WhatsApp, Viber, and
Telegram. They conclude that Telegram is the best messaging
applications in terms of security, WhatsApp is best in terms of
ease-of-use, while Viber is another good option with many in-
tegrated features like in-app voice calls. Abu-Salma et al. [1]
undertake a user study to understand whether end-users un-
derstand the security features that Telegram offers. They find
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that most of the users tend to use less secure features of the
Telegram application, and they overall feel secure because they
“are using a secure tool.” Also, the authors analyze Telegram’s
user interface (UI) and find that it includes a lot of technical
jargon and inconsistencies, and that some of the security fea-
tures offered by the platform are not explained clearly in the
UI.
Nikkah et al. [14] study the use of Telegram by Iranian
immigrants during their immigration procedure by observing
30 Iranian immigration-related groups. They show several ex-
amples of how Telegram bots are used enforce specific poli-
cies, how groups are moderated, and how pinned messages
are posted by administrators. Hashemi and Chahooki [11]
study the group features of 900K Iranian channels and 300K
Iranian groups on Telegram with the goal to identify high-
quality groups (e.g., professional and business groups) over
low-quality groups (e.g., dating groups). They find that high-
quality groups tend to have more phone numbers in their mes-
sages, have longer messages, and have more user engagement
when compared to low-quality groups. Asnafi et al. [4] exam-
ine the use of the Telegram platform in various Iranian aca-
demic libraries. They collect data from channels posted on the
websites of the libraries and find that users mostly talked about
news and information, book introductions, and various files.
They also note that most of the messages contained images.
Akbari and Gabdulhakov [2] study the ban of Telegram by
Russia and Iran following Telegram’s refusal to give access
to encrypted data on the platform.
Dargahi Nobari et al. [6] perform a structural and topical
analysis of content posted on the Telegram platform. By col-
lecting data from 2.6K groups/channels and 219K messages,
they build a graph based on the mentions, concluding that the
mentions graph is extremely sparse and includes several sep-
arated connected components that indicates that users have a
low tendency to mention other users.
Other previous research focuses on studying how terrorist
organizations like ISIS use Telegram for various purposes like
dissemination of content and ideology, as well as recruiting
fighters and terrorists [16, 21, 19].
Other dataset papers. Since the main contribution of this pa-
per is the rich dataset we release, here we briefly overview pre-
vious work that focuses on releasing datasets from various Web
communities. Garimella and Tyson [10] study the WhatsApp
messaging platform and they share their tools for obtaining
public WhatsApp groups data, as well as a dataset from 178
groups that includes data for 454K messages posted from 45K
users.
Fair and Wesslen [8] focus on Gab by releasing a dataset
that includes 37M posts and 24M comments posted between
August 2016 and December 2018. Zignanie et al. [22] focus
on Mastodon, a decentralized social network, by releasing a
dataset of 5M posts: each post is associated with a label indi-
cating whether the post or its content is inappropriate (accord-
ing to the users that made the post). Founta et al. [9] provide
a large scale dataset of tweets that are annotated on whether
they are hateful, abusive, spam, or a normal tweet. To do this,
they leverage crowd workers and annotate each tweet accord-
ing to the majority agreement between all the crowd workers.
Brena et al. [5] release a data collection pipeline and a large
scale dataset related to the dissemination of news articles on
Twitter. The data collection relies on a list of news sources and
generates a large dataset of articles from these sources that are
posted on Twitter. Salem et al. [17] focus on the Syrian War
and release a carefully curated dataset of 804 news articles that
are also labeled as real or fake. Norregaard et al. [15] release
a set of 713K news articles collected between February and
November, 2018, from 194 news sources. Also, for each news
source in their dataset, they include ratings from eight differ-
ent assessment sites that include, among others, scores related
to the reliability, trust, bias, and journalistic standards of each
news source.
3 Description of the Pushshift Tele-
gram Dataset
3.1 Data Collection
Our data collection on Telegram is channel-based. Our goal
is to collect data and metadata for publicly-viewable channels
and public “chats”. Typically each Telegram channel is set up
by its owner to allow broadcast, or one-way, communication
from a small set senders to a broader set of general channel
users. However, each Telegram channel can also optionally
have an associated “chat” that allows communication among
all channel participants. Finally, some non-chat channels are
not broadcast-only, but have themselves been configured to al-
low two-way communication between all participants on the
channel.
To collect content and metadata from all of these types of
channels and chats, we use Telethon1, a Python interface to
the Telegram API. We began with a seed list of approximately
250 primarily English-language broadcast channels and chat
channels on Telegram. This initial list consists of 124 channels
focusing on right-wing extremist politics and 137 channels
cryptocurrency-related channels. To grow the list of channels,
we rely on the “forwarding” feature within Telegram wherein
content can be forwarded between channels. Each time we dis-
cover content forwarded from a channel that is not already on
our list, we add it, collect its data, and follow all of its chan-
nels. This snowball “crawling” approach has so far resulted in
a list of 27,801 channels.
Channel data exposed by the Telegram API includes meta-
data such as the unique identification number, title, creation
date, and various channel settings (e.g. usage configurations,
administrator restrictions, and whether the channel is a bot), as
well as the actual messages sent in the channel. Some calcu-
lated fields are also included, such as a current count of users,
the identification number of the current “pinned” post, and a
count of how many messages are unread.
Users communicate on Telegram channels by sending “mes-
sages” to the channel. Messages can either be original con-
1https://docs.telethon.dev/en/latest/
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Figure 1: Number of channels created per month.
tent posted to a channel, or can be forwarded content from an-
other channel or from another user. The access rights to read
a message can be restricted by the channel settings, for exam-
ple allowing anyone to read the messages, or requiring users
to “join” the channel before being able to view the messages.
Message data exposed by the Telegram API includes meta-
data such as the datetime that the message was sent, whether
it included media (e.g. images or video), and the identifica-
tion number of the user who sent the message. For each mes-
sage sender, Telegram provides details such as their username,
whether they are a bot, whether they are a verified user, and so
on.
We stored data and metadata for each channel/chat, mes-
sage, and user in a PostgreSQL relational database manage-
ment system. We currently do not collect media that accompa-
nies the messages. This will change in the future as we find a
more robust storage space solution.
3.2 Dataset Structure
Our static snapshot consists of three files:
• Accounts metadata: A newline delimited JSON file that
includes the metadata for all the accounts that posted on
any of the channels in our dataset (2.2M). Documentation
for the fields included in this file are provided from the
Telethon library and is available at https://tl.telethon.dev/
constructors/user.html.
• Channels metadata: A newline delimited JSON file
that includes the metadata for all the channels in our
dataset (27.8K). The documentation for the fields in-
cluded in the channels metadata file are available at
https://tl.telethon.dev/types/chat full.html and https://tl.
telethon.dev/constructors/channel full.html.
• Messages: A newline delimited JSON file including all
the messages posted in these channels (317M). A doc-
umentation of the fields included in this file are pro-
vided by the Telethon library and is publicly available at
https://tl.telethon.dev/constructors/message.html
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Figure 2: CDF of the number of registered users per channel.
3.3 FAIR principles
We emphasize that our dataset fully conforms with the FAIR
principles.2 Specifically, our dataset is Findable since it is pub-
licly available via the Zenodo service3, which assigns a digital
object identifier (DOI): 10.5281/zenodo.3607497. Our dataset
is also Accessible since it can be accessed by anyone in the
world, while at the same time the format of the dataset is JSON,
which is a widely used standard for data format. Due to the use
of the widely known JSON standard, our dataset is Interoper-
able as almost every programming language has a library to
work with data in JSON format. Finally, we release the full
dataset and we provide a description of the dataset and the
pointers to the Telethon API documentation that allow the in-
terested researchers to understand the data and work with it.
We ask that researchers cite our work if they use the dataset.
Thus, our dataset is Reusable.
4 Dataset General Characterization
Channels. Overall, our dataset includes information from
27,801 channels. Fig. 1 shows how these channels are created
over time: we plot the number of channels that are created per
2https://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/
3https://zenodo.org/
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Figure 3: CDF of the number of messages per channel.
month. Telegram introduced channels as a feature in Septem-
ber 2015, and our data includes 3,024 channels created in
that very first month. We find that the channel creations spike
on October 2015 with 4,854 channels created. New channel
creations drop in subsequent months. Between March 2016-
October 2017, and November 2017-August 2019, we observe
a steady rate of channel creation, with the latter period having
slightly more channels created.
Next, we look into the number of registered users per chan-
nel in our dataset. We find a mean number of registered users
of 9823.3, while the median is 864. Fig. 2 shows the Cumu-
lative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of regis-
tered accounts per channel. We observe that the majority of
the channels in our dataset (85.2%) have at least 100 regis-
tered users, while 47.4% of the channels have at least 1000
registered users.
Fig. 3 shows the number of messages per channel. We find,
a mean of 6937.5 messages per channel, while the median is
1644. Also, we observe that 60% of the channels have at least
1K messages.
Messages. Overall, our dataset includes information for
317,224,715 messages. Out of those, 3,069,829 are just ser-
vice messages indicating an event that happened on a specific
channel (e.g., user adds, errors, and other status messages). The
remaining 314,154,886 messages are actual messages that in-
clude content shared on the channel by users. Fig. 4 shows the
monthly number of non-status messages that are shared in our
dataset. We observe that, during 2016 and 2017, message ac-
tivity is somewhat stable with around 5M messages per month,
while we find a peak in message activity during August 2019
with approximately 17M messages. This peak in August 2019
coincides with the addition of 19,000 new Telegram users dur-
ing the Hong Kong protests-[12].
Fig. 5 shows the CDF of the number of characters per mes-
sage, which gives an intuition of how lengthy Telegram mes-
sages are. We find that messages have a mean number of char-
acters equal to 152.2, while the median is 49 characters per
message. We also observe that a substantial percentage of mes-
sages (16.1%) have an empty message, likely indicating that
users are sharing messages with multimedia and no textual
message.
Forwarded Messages. We also assess how common it is to
forward messages across channels on Telegram. Other popu-
lar messaging apps like WhatsApp limit the number of times
a specific user can forward a specific message, in an attempt
to limit the spread of misinformation [13]. Previous research
suggest that this counter measure can offer substantial delays
in the propagation of misinformation [7]. Telegram does not
limit the number of times a message can be forwarded. In our
dataset, we find that 25,601,073 (8.1%) of all the messages are
actually forwards from previously posted messages on other
channels, or forwards from messages other users posted to
their personal user channels. This indicates that forwarding
messages across Telegram channels and between users and
broadcast channels is a common operation on the platform.
Next we investigate the users and broadcast channels involved
in the forwarding of messages. We find 346,937 user channels
or broadcast channels where forwarded messages originate. At
the same time we find 27,039 broadcast channels where mes-
sages were forwarded to. Fig. 6 shows the CDF of the number
of messages per channel for the the channels that messages
were forwarded from and to. We observe that the number of
messages-per-channel in the channels forwarded from is sub-
stantially smaller than the number of messages-per-channel in
the channels forwarded to. The from mean is 946.8 vs to mean
of 73.9, while from median is 151 vs to median of 3. This dif-
ference is due to the number of channels that messages were
forwarded from is substantially larger (346K vs 27K). Overall,
these findings indicate that message forwarding across Tele-
gram channels is a popular feature of the Telegram platform,
and this feature can be studied by researchers to assess the ef-
fect of this feature in emerging phenomena like the spread of
false information, hateful content, etc.
Media. Next we look into whether messages contain media at-
tachments, and what the different types of media attachments
are in our dataset. We observe that 50.1% of the messages in-
clude media attachments with 48.1% of all the messages con-
taining exactly one attachment. Fig 7 shows the distribution of
all the media attachments into types according to Telegram. We
observe that in our dataset, 53.8% of the attachments are pho-
tos, 29.4% are documents, 16.5% are Web pages, while the rest
0.3% of the attachments are Polls, Geo locations, Games, Con-
tacts, Venues, or Invoices. Fig. 8 shows the CDF of the number
of media per channel in our dataset. We observe that Telegram
is a rich source of media: more than half of the channels have
shared over 1K media attachments.
Mentions and Hashtags. Here we investigate whether Tele-
gram users are using mentions and hashtags in their messages.
Overall, we find 7,638,430 (2.3%) messages contain hashtags,
and 87,029,573 (27.7%) messages contain mentions. This in-
dicates that Telegram users are more frequently mentioning
other users or channels when compared to using hashtags in
their messages. Table 1 report the 20 most popular mentions
and hashtags that we find in our dataset, as well as their re-
spective percentage over the overall number of messages that
include hashtags/mentions. In terms of hashtags, we observe
several international hashtags like #Trending, #Hot, #news. In-
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Figure 4: Temporal overview of the messages that are included in our dataset. We show the number of messages per month.
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Figure 5: CDF of the number of characters per message.
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Figure 6: Distribution of number of messages per channel that were
forwarded.
terestingly, we also find divisive hashtags like #USAKillsYe-
meniPeople. In terms of mentions, we observe that most of
them is related to Iran, hence highlighting the popularity of
Iranian users on Telegram in general and in particular in our
collected sample.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the media attachments according to their
type.
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Figure 8: CDF of the number of media attachments posted per chan-
nel
We also plot the number of occurrences per hashtag/mention
in Fig. 9. For hashtags we find a mean number of 14.3 occur-
rences per hashtag, while 55.4% of the hashtags occur only
once in our dataset. For mentions we find a mean number of
82.4 occurrences per mention, while 49.3% of the mentions
occur only once in our dataset.
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Hashtag %(out of 7.6M) Mention
%
(out of 87M)
Trending 3.23% tahlilgarantala 2.59%
Hot 2.17% tahlilgarantala ons 1.15%
Syria 1.07% tahlilgarantala absh 0.89%
ULTIMORA 0.81% noticiasul 0.59%
request 0.75% tahlilgarantala Seke 0.55%
Step News 0.64% Twitter Farsi 0.48%
Nima 0.55% ilnair 0.27%
habrahabr 0.55% TEQNYEBOT BOT 0.27%
Geral 0.51% MyAsriran 0.23%
USAKillsYemeniPeople 0.48% iran times 0.21%
Mundo 0.44% haberbulteni 0.20%
Venezuela 0.42% khabaredagh 0.19%
Amazon 0.42% BI20ST 0.19%
news 0.41% Farsna 0.18%
Marvel 0.39% K BER1 0.18%
Sport 0.38% KNWAT 0.15%
tw 0.35% T5TTI 0.15%
soc 0.34% caspiankhabar 0.14%
Economia 0.34% alalamnewstv 0.14%
SouCurioso 0.33% Khabar Varzeshi 0.14%
Table 1: Top 20 hashtags and mentions that we find in our dataset
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Figure 9: CDF of the number of occurrences per hashtag/mention.
5 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we described the Pushshift Telegram Dataset, to
the best of our knowledge, the largest and most comprehensive
Telegram dataset available to date. Our dataset includes over
317M messages from 2.2M unique users across 27.8K chan-
nels. In addition to the data, we also release the source code
we used to collect it. Our dataset can be used by researchers
to advance the frontier of knowledge around a variety of top-
ics. For example, our dataset includes a large number of mes-
sages from right wing extremist groups, as well as more global
movements like the Hong Kong protesters. Thus, researchers
interested in understanding how computer mediated communi-
cation affects and is used by disinformation campaigns, violent
organization, as well as more traditional political protests will
find great value in the dataset presented herein. Along with the
static snapshot, we supply the source for collecting data from
Telegram channels. We argue that this implementation will be
extremely useful to researchers that are interested in studying
Telegram and its various aspects.
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